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Some 70% of the world’s continental shelf fisheries are
classified as fully or overexploited (F.A.O. 1997). In
order to meet the ever-increasing demand for fish
products, exploratory ventures are searching for un-
exploited stocks on the continental shelf slopes and
beyond (Moore and Mace 1999). When new stocks
are discovered, there is inevitably considerable uncer-
tainty about their size or productivity, industry has to
decide how much to invest in the fishery, and fishery
management authorities are faced with critical decisions
on management controls. Commercial catch trends
and time-series of research surveys are inevitably
lacking and, therefore, the traditional tools for stock
assessment are not applicable. All therefore encounter
large risks. These risks can be particularly severe for
deep-water fish, which tend to be long-lived and
hence highly vulnerable to overexploitation, whereas
the cost of exploiting stocks at great depth and far
from land is often high. Given the current expansion
of many fishing fleets into deep- and distant-water
fisheries, especially those for Patagonian toothfish
Dissostichus eleginoides, alfonsino Beryx splendens
and orange roughy Hoplostethus atlanticus, these
risks are very real and need addressing.
There are currently few well-established protocols on
how to manage a newly developing fishery, apart from
some theoretical, untested suggestions (e.g. Smith et al.
1992, Clark and Tracey 1994, Clark 1995, Francis and
Shotton 1997, Branch 1998, McAllister and Kirkwood
1998, Walters 1998, Miller 1999). One example of an
adaptive management proposal for a new fishery that
has been put into practice is the ORH1 orange roughy
fishery in the Bay of Plenty, New Zealand. The in-
tention for that fishery, which essentially was only
discovered in 1994, was to allow catches to increase
to 1 000 tons per year over a five-year period in a
controlled fishing-down experiment, while the fishery
was monitored through surveys and analysis of catch
data (Starr et al. 1996). Catches were considerably
below this target level throughout the period, but sur-
veys still indicated a large reduction in biomass. Recent
analysis of the data, however, suggest that the decline
was due to a change in distribution of the stock rather
than solely attributable to fishing, so an increase in
the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) in line with the
adaptive management programme has been proposed
(Anon. 2001).
In any new fishery, managers must decide how to
limit entry, and harvesting decision rules and manage-
ment strategies need to be developed. Decisions on the
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THE ORANGE ROUGHY FISHERY OF NAMIBIA: LESSONS TO BE
LEARNED ABOUT MANAGING A DEVELOPING FISHERY
D. C. BOYER*, C. H. KIRCHNER*, M. K. McALLISTER†, A. STABY*
and B. I. STAALESEN‡
Exploration for orange roughy Hoplostethus atlanticus in Namibia started in 1994 and within 12 months several
aggregations had been discovered, suggesting the existence of a biomass sufficient to support a viable fishery.
At that early stage it was realized that few, if any, recognized management procedures existed for newly developing
fisheries, especially with the paucity of data such as existed on Namibian orange roughy. The development of
the Namibian orange roughy fishery is reviewed to document the management strategies implemented and how
the management of the fishery evolved. The first six years of the fishery are described, including the three-year
exploration phase, several years of profitable exploitation, and the severe decline in catch rates. Whether the 
decline is attributable to fishing mortality or to change in the aggregating behaviour of orange roughy, or both,
is not clear. Although many aspects of the precautionary approach were followed, a risk analysis applied and a
number of innovative management methods implemented (e.g. incentives to promote exploratory fishing, use of
Bayesian statistical methods, implementation of a management plan for long-term total allowable catches), the
aggregating biomass declined to between 10 and 50% of virgin levels within the six years. The management
methods applied are evaluated in the light of the severe decline in catch rate experienced in 1998 and 1999, so
that others may learn from the experience.
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data to be collected (usually with limited resources)
must be made early, and robust stock assessment
methods appropriate to data-poor situations need to
be applied. Simultaneously, development of the fishery
must be encouraged, despite the high costs and the
lack of guarantees of long-term, economically viable
returns. A formal assessment of the risks of overfishing
has been proposed for many types of fisheries, in-
cluding developing ones (Francis and Shotton 1997),
but this has only been applied rarely to management
(Bergh and Butterworth 1987, Butterworth and Bergh
1993).
In this paper, the recent development of the Namibian
orange roughy fishery is reviewed to document the
strategies implemented and how the management of
the fishery evolved in tandem with the fishery itself.
The first six years of the fishery are described; they
include the three-year exploration phase, several years
of profitable exploitation, and the subsequent severe
decline in catch rates. Many innovative fisheries man-
agement tools were applied, including aspects of the
precautionary approach. A risk analysis was attempted
and Bayesian statistical methods were used to model
the resource probabilistically and to incorporate judge-
ments about the potential biases in different indices of
abundance. Also, incentives were introduced to pro-
mote exploratory fishing, and a long-term management
plan was implemented. Despite the implementation
of these strategies, the fishery declined sharply within
just six years. Finally, some suggestions are given on
what went wrong, and why, and how in hindsight dif-
ferent recommendations may have been offered to
management.
The paper is structured largely in chronological
order. Some notes on the pertinent biological aspects
of orange roughy are followed by a description of the
deep-water fishery. This is followed by a year-by-year
account of the development of the fishery, the data
collected, the stock assessment techniques employed
and the management decisions implemented. Finally,
the most valuable lessons to be learned from the expe-
rience with Namibian orange roughy are discussed.
ORANGE ROUGHY
Orange roughy, a trachichthyid fish, has a worldwide
distribution (Kotlyar 1996) at depths between 500 and
1 500 m. Major stocks are found off New Zealand
and Australia, and smaller ones along the Mid-Atlantic
Ridge, off Namibia (Clark et al. 2000) and along the
Madagascar Ridge in the southern Indian Ocean. The
common name is attributable to its body colour and
hard skeletal plates that give the head a “rough” appear-
ance. The flesh is soft-boned, firm and white, and it has
a subtle taste. It is popular in the USA, where it com-
mands high prices.
The orange roughy fishery in New Zealand started
in 1979, and catches peaked in 1989 at 54 000 tons
(Robertson 1991, Clark and Tracey 1994). TACs were
reduced during the 1990s, reaching <20 000 tons by
the end of the decade as some of the main stocks be-
came fully or overexploited, although annual catches
were supplemented with short-lived large catches from
newly developed fisheries for the species (Clark 2001).
The Australian fishery started in 1986, peaked in 1990
with an annual catch of 42 000 tons (Smith 1991), but
declined to 5 000 tons by 1995. Until recently the only
other fishery of any note, apart from Namibia’s, was
a small and inconsistent fishery that developed in 1990
in the North Atlantic, yielding peak annual catches of
some 4 000 tons (Tracey and Horn 1999). Then, during
1999 and 2000, a largely unregulated fishery developed
along the Madagascar Ridge, although its long-term
potential is not known.
Orange roughy form dense spawning aggregations
during the austral winter, between late June and early
August in New Zealand (Clark 1995), Australia (Koslow
et al. 1994) and Namibia. These aggregations are
often associated with bottom features such as pinnacles
and canyons, although the fish may form plumes ex-
tending up to 200 m above the seabed. The formation
of aggregations is well-synchronized and at the same
time each year (Clark 1996), although not all individuals
spawn annually (Clark and Tracey 1994). The aggre-
gating behaviour persists throughout the year, but at
lower densities outside the spawning season. It is as-
sumed that these aggregations are for feeding purposes
(Clark and Tracey 1994). A consequence of this sea-
sonal trend in aggregating behaviour is that catch
rates are high from June to August, but much lower for
the rest of the year (Staby 2000).
Aggregating behaviour makes orange roughy highly
susceptible to overfishing, trawl catches of >20 tons
within several minutes of bottom contact being com-
mon. However, such densities allied to a hard, rough
seabed, require fishers to be highly skilled and to
have available advanced fish-finding equipment and
robust trawl gear. Considerable gear damage and loss
of equipment is quite normal.
The longevity of orange roughy is a controversial
issue (Tracey and Horn 1999), with some studies
concluding that fish may live more than 100 years
(Mace et al. 1990, Fenton et al. 1991, Smith et al. 1995)
and others claiming that they are much shorter lived
(Gauldie 1998; see Francis [1992] for a description
of the basic life history characteristics of New Zealand
orange roughy). In Namibia it was decided to take the
precautionary approach so, for stock assessment
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purposes, orange roughy were considered long-lived,
with slow growth rates, late maturity and low fecun-
dity (Clark 1995). Therefore, productivity of orange
roughy is considered to be low, with long-term yields
predicted to be in the order of 1– 2% of virgin
biomass, and the biomass at maximum sustainable
yield BMSY at about 30% of the pristine biomass
(Francis et al. 1993). A study in 1999 on age and
growth of Namibian orange roughy revealed that age
at first maturity was attained earlier off Namibia than
off Australasia (23 cf. 29 years), that growth was
faster, natural mortality higher (0.055 cf. 0.045 year-1)
and that productivity was therefore greater. These 
parameters were used in the assessment of Namibian
orange roughy from 2000 onwards. Orange roughy
swimbladders are filled with oil and wax, so their tar-
get strength, although uncertain, is probably around 
-50 dB. Fish are therefore difficult to find and assess
acoustically (Elliott and Kloser 1993, Clark 1996,
Boyer and Hampton 2001a). The well-developed ag-
gregating behaviour often results in catch-per-unit-ef-
fort (cpue) indices from commercial vessels being bi-
ased (Clark 1996, Kirchner and McAllister in press).
Similarly, surveys are liable to suffer from high levels of
variance. Owing to its low fecundity, fishing-down ex-
periments to determine growth and productivity carry
a high risk (Clark and Tracey 1994).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN DEEP-
WATER FISHERY
Some targeted and incidental fishing on orange roughy
had taken place earlier, but 1994 is generally considered
the start of the Namibian fishery. A summary of the
number of vessels active in the fishery and their annual
catches is given in Table I.
In 1994 a single experimental licence was granted
to one fishing company to explore the Namibian EEZ
in depths exceeding 700 m for monkfish Lophius
spp., deep-water catfish Lepidion capensis, warty dory
Allocyttus verrucosus, spiky dory Neocyttus rhom-
boidalis, alfonsino Beryx splendens, jewel squid
Histioteuthis spp., and trachichthyids Hoplostethus spp.
The licensee purchased fishing records of some
companies and nations (notably the former Eastern
Bloc states) for the period prior to Namibian Inde-
pendence to determine where orange roughy had
been caught. In addition, the licensee conducted a side-
scan sonar survey in 1994 to search for suitable habitat,
and hence possible areas of orange roughy distribution.
In June 1994, exploration started along the southern
Namibian shelf break, especially around the Tripp
Seamount (29°40´S, 14°17´E; Fig. 1), in a search for
suitable topography. Despite several fishing trips each
lasting about three weeks, few orange roughy or other
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Table I: Number of participants and annual catches in the
Namibian orange roughy fishery (inactive licences
in parenthesis)
Year Companies Vessels Catch (tons)
1994 1 1 29
1995 1 1 6 743
1996 1 3 11 892
1997 3 (5) 4 15 517
1998 3 (5) 5 11 792
1999 3 (5) 5 2 498




















Fig. 1: Map of the northern Benguela, depicting the four Quota
Management Areas and the location of the Tripp
Seamount, another area where orange roughy have
been found
fish of commercial value were found.
The area explored was extended northwards and
the first orange roughy aggregation was discovered in
January 1995, at the aptly named Hotspot (19°20´S,
10°05´E; Fig. 1). During April 1995, a second ground,
Rix (22°30´S, 12°40´E), was found, although catches
were small and the ground was only determined to be
of commercial value early in 1996. Johnies (26°20´S,
13°30´E) was found soon after Rix, and Frankies
(24°30´S, 13°20´E) was the final ground to be dis-
covered, early in 1996. 
Three of the four grounds are on the shelf break
off central Namibia and are separated by about 200 km
(Fig. 1). The fourth ground, Hotspot, is off northern
Namibia on the southern edge of the Walvis Ridge.
The biological characteristics of orange roughy on the
central grounds are similar, but those on Hotspot are
generally larger and have greater age- and length-at-
maturity characteristics (Lesch 2000). Frankies is the
only ground where there is more than one aggregation.
The exploratory phase (equivalent to Phase I in
Miller’s [1999] terminology) of the fishery culminated
at the end of 1996, with the call for new companies to
apply to join the fishery. In early 1997 the fishing year
was changed from a calendar year to May–April and an
additional four companies were given licences. Three
companies were given quotas, allowing them to fish
in the established fishing areas (see below); in defer-
ence to the exploratory investment, the original licensee
was issued 50% of the annual TAC, with the remainder
shared between the two newcomers. In all, five vessels
received licences to fish for deep-water species. The
two newer companies were only permitted to conduct
exploratory fishing, an option they did not exercise
(Table I).
MANAGEMENT OF NAMIBIAN ORANGE
ROUGHY
Once orange roughy had been demonstrated to have
the potential for a long-term fishery, the next phase
(Phase II – Miller 1999) was to initiate active man-
agement and research. Recognizing the lack of
trained and experienced “deep-water” fisheries biolo-
gists and managers in Namibia, and the lack of data,
a working group of government fisheries managers and
scientists, plus senior managers from each company
(initially just the original licensee) was established in
1995 (Fig. 2). This group, termed the Deep Water
Fisheries Working Group (DWFWG) was mandated
to “… promote the rational development of the
Namibian deep-water fisheries…”, and furthermore
to “… ensure the long-term sustainable utilisation of
the stocks exploited through proactive research and
co-management strategies.” This mandate was inter-
preted to include developing an adaptive management
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Fig. 2:  Structure of the Deep Water Fisheries Working Group, with Government personnel highlighted in grey
strategy, making recommendations on TACs and pro-
moting compliance. From 1999 onwards, the DWFWG
and government scientists submitted recommendations
on catch limits independently because consensus on
stock abundance could not be reached, government
scientists opting for the more precautionary (pes-
simistic) approach (see below).
The DWFWG was required to ensure that the neces-
sary expertise and resources were available to con-
duct the relevant research through training of local
staff and, where necessary, to recruit consultants on
short-term contracts, particularly for stock assessment
purposes. The Namibian Ministry of Fisheries and
Marine Resources allocated two scientists to orange
roughy research and contracted scientists from the
National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research
in New Zealand to advise and assist. The fishing in-
dustry jointly contracted South African stock assess-
ment and acoustic experts to provide competence in
these fields, and also brought in their own scientific
consultants, mostly with experience in the New
Zealand deep-water fishery. To provide basic biological
data on orange roughy, fisheries observers were placed
on commercial vessels to collect length frequency and,
in some cases, maturity data.
Exploration
In order to promote new fisheries within the Namibian
EEZ, experimental guidelines were developed, al-
though to date these have only been applied for orange
roughy. Companies were encouraged to search for
new fish stocks and to develop new fishing tech-
niques, with the following provisions:
• only a single company (and usually only a single
vessel) would be licensed for each experimental
venture;
• if the venture was successful, the company would
be guaranteed a future proportion of the annual TAC
after the experimental phase;
• catches would be monitored until a trigger level was
reached that initiated research activity;
• interim limitations would be imposed on catches,
based on a precautionary “guess” of the appropriate
level.
This policy guaranteed participants a long-term in-
terest in order to promote the development of the
fishery in a rational and sustainable manner. The last
two provisions were included because the Ministry
does not have the resources to investigate all potential
fisheries, so only those that show signs of economic
importance can be “researched” actively.
To further encourage exploration for new grounds,
and to define the precise extent of existing grounds,
vessels were required from March 1996 to expend a
proportion of their total annual fishing effort in areas
where little effort had previously been directed. Each
known ground was subdivided into inner and outer
strata, known as quota management areas (QMAs).
The inner QMAs represented areas that provided high
average annual cpues (>5 tons tow-1) and the outer
QMAs were defined as those areas surrounding the
inner QMAs where catches >2 tons tow-1 had been
achieved. On two of the grounds, Frankies and Rix,
only 40% of tows per year were permitted in the
inner QMA. Because of the rough terrain at Johnies,
this proportion was increased to 50%, but at Hotspot,
a clearly defined aggregation on a pinnacle, no further
exploratory fishing was required.
This system was simplified for the 1998/99 season
to a single stratum per QMA, defined by a circle of
30 mile radius around the geographic centre of each
aggregation. This allowed for possible movements of
fish between years and made the control aspects easier
to monitor. 
Unlimited fishing was permitted in the areas outside
the QMAs, defined as Exploratory Fishing Areas
(EFAs), i.e. TACs related only to fish caught within the
QMAs. To encourage vessels to search for new aggre-
gations in the EFA, companies were guaranteed 50%
of any TAC set for an aggregation that they discovered
for a period of three years. The definition of “discovery”
was complicated, but essentially it required a company
to catch 100 tons of orange roughy within an area of
5 miles radius within a period of three months. The
company was then granted exclusive rights to that
area, but it had to catch another 500 tons in the fol-
lowing three months before it was accepted as an
“aggregation” and hence qualified as a new QMA.
Stock assessment
Abundance estimation surveys were conducted annually
between 1997 and 2000 using acoustic and swept-
area methods, with the assistance of the fishing com-
panies, but coordinated through the DWFWG. The
acoustics surveys were conducted on board the R.V.
Dr Fridtjof Nansen between 1997 and 1999 and on a
commercial vessel in 2000, but with commercial ves-
sels identifying targets (Boyer and Hampton 2001a).
The swept-area surveys were carried out by the F.V.
Southern Aquarius during the first three years, and
on a smaller fishing vessel, the F.V. Emanguluko, in
2000.
Towards the end of the exploratory phase of the
fishery, it was decided to base harvesting decisions on
stock assessment and population modelling and to
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develop an adaptive management strategy based on
formal risk analysis (Walters and Hilborn 1976, 1978,
Walters 1986).
Two basic approaches to the management of orange
roughy were considered at the start of the fishery: to
conduct a fishing-down experiment, so determining
the productivity of the resource (Hilborn and Sibert
1988, Hilborn and Walters 1992) or, alternatively, to
gather sufficient biological information prior to im-
plementation of any fishing-down policy to ensure
that any build-up in fishing effort should be gradual
(Clark 1995, but see also Richards and Maguire 1998).
The DWFWG opted for the former approach because
it was argued that, until sufficient fishing pressure
was applied to elicit a change in catch rate, determining
productivity would be difficult. However, because
there was a high degree of uncertainty and inadequacy
in the data, an attempt was made to implement a pre-
cautionary approach (Richards and Maguire 1998) at
a number of stages of the stock assessment. This in-
volved the use of probabilistic modelling to quantify
uncertainty in biomass estimates, and attempting to
prevent fishing-down towards the BMSY level too
rapidly. A long period of fishing-down to BMSY was
planned and, in addition, the recommended TAC was
set well below the level calculated to meet the fishing-
down objectives. A further precautionary strategy
was to set non-transferable quotas for each QMA. 
A fisheries strategy commonly applied is to at-
tempt to manage a stock at its most productive level,
providing a sustainable yield. However, for a developing
fishery that level is highly uncertain. The optimal catch
target reference point 0.5MB0 (Gulland 1971, Shepherd
1981) was initially used in New Zealand, where M is
the rate of natural mortality and B0 is the long-term
average unfished stock biomass. This did not perform
well, and it was replaced by a stock biomass target
reference point of 0.5B0 (Clark 1995), often assumed
to be the approximate stock size for maximum bio-
logical yield (Hilborn and Sibert 1988).
However, in the first models of Namibian orange
roughy (Branch and Butterworth 1996), maximum
sustainable yield (MSY) was assumed to be at 0.3B0
(from Francis et al. 1992), the level applied in the
New Zealand and Australian orange roughy fisheries.
It was later decided that this was a risky target for a
stock that forms dense aggregations and is thereby
vulnerable to rapid depletion and overshooting of the
level (Clark 1995), so in 1998 it was decided to set an
alternative minimum threshold of 0.5B0, which would
allow a larger buffer in the fishing-down phase.
FIRST STOCK ASSESSMENT (JANUARY 1997)
The first stock assessment of orange roughy was under-
taken in January 1997. The only information available
was commercial cpue. As at that stage no other method
of determining abundance was available, density, and
hence biomasses, were calculated for each ground
through a swept-area analysis of the data by combining
all trawls from the commencement of the exploratory
fishery to June 1996 (Branch 1996). Areas with high
catch rates and fishing intensity were enclosed in
polygons (known as Spawning Boxes), and other stra-
ta were defined around the Spawning Boxes based on
depth limits of 500 and 1 000 m. Biomass estimates
using cpue data are normally treated as relative in-
dices, because typically they are biased. As many
members of the DWFWG were concerned at applying
commercial cpue to a stock assessment procedure that
requires random samples, an attempt was made to es-
timate these biases using the collective knowledge of
the Group. They included biases from directed fishing
by commercial fishers and biases associated with the
vertical distribution of orange roughy in the water
column with respect to the part sampled by the trawl
gear (Table II). Bias correction factors (Table II) were
then applied to the baseline estimates. This resulted in
absolute abundance estimates for each ground, totalling
306 000 tons (CV 0.34) for all grounds combined
(Branch 1996). This abundance estimate was considered
to be the virgin biomass (pre-exploitation biomass or
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Table II: An example of the bias factors applied to swept-area estimates from commercial data of orange roughy off Namibia
(after Brandão 1999)
Bias factor Minimum Most likely range Maximum
Catchability/herding inside aggregations 0.21 0.36–0.72 0.86
Directed fishing inside aggregations 0.45 0.52–0.80 0.90
Increase/decrease in size of aggregations 0.80 0.80–1.20 1.20
Lost catch 1.00 1.03–1.07 1.10
Skipper-estimated catches 1.06 1.06–1.12 1.12
Catchability/herding outside aggregations 0.50 0.58–0.84 0.92
Directed fishing outside aggregations 0.20 0.30–0.70 0.80
Fish outside defined strata 1.05 1.05–1.15 1.15
Erroneous zero catches 1.02 1.04–1.08 1.11
B0) in further analyses until the commercial swept-
area methodology was revised for the 2000 assessment
(Kirchner and McAllister in press).
The biases were estimated through a negotiation pro-
cess until consensus was reached between the various
participants. There was considerable disagreement
about the use of this method, even with the incorpora-
tion of ranges to the biases. The latter were described
as probability density functions, with the limits of
their ranges tending to reflect the limits of the various
“feelings”, and the “most likely” range being the con-
sensus (Table II). In retrospect, the distributions for
some of the bias factors were likely estimated with
excessive certainty, resulting in narrow ranges, espe-
cially as the application procedures weighted the biases
heavily towards the central part of the range, so losing
the extremes. However, sensitivity tests of the various
ranges proposed showed that, in general, the resulting
biomasses differed by a few tens of thousands of tons,
and the CV by a few percentage points (Branch
1998). Of greater importance, the application of con-
ventional swept-area methodology to commercial catch
data was flawed and the resulting biomass estimate
was grossly over-inflated (see Table V and Fourth
Stock Assessment below).
A management approach of an initial fishing-down
phase was proposed, i.e. taking catches in excess of
sustainable yields for a few years, followed by a con-
stant reduction in TAC until the maximum sustain-
able yield level was reached and retained. The likely
effects of alternative catch levels over a 14-year period
on the orange roughy stock levels were modelled by
Butterworth and Branch (1996). The analysis used a
deterministic version of an age-structured production
model (Francis 1992, Francis et al. 1995) in which
values of the model parameters, such as growth and
age at maturity, were based on New Zealand estimates
(Doonan 1991). Butterworth and Branch (1996) 
recommended an initial strategy of setting a TAC of
15 000 tons for seven years, declining eventually to 
6 000 tons.
McAllister and Kirkwood (1997) repeated this risk
assessment using a Bayesian approach that included
stochastic recruitment, accounted for uncertainties of
natural mortality and assumed a greater uncertainty
of the “virgin” biomass estimate. Risks were calculated,
also using a constant TAC for seven years, then de-
clining linearly to 6 000 tons after 14 years. The results
showed that implementing an initial catch quota of
15 000 tons or even 20 000 tons gave a risk of <10%
of stock depletion below 0.5B0.
Although both methods showed that a TAC of
20 000 tons posed low risk, the DWFWG recognized
the uncertainties in the assessment, attributable to
lack of data, and proposed a more cautious approach,
recommending 15 000 tons for the 1997/98 fishing
season. A final TAC of 12 000 tons was allocated by
the Namibian authorities.
SECOND STOCK ASSESSMENT (JANUARY 1998)
The assessment was repeated in January 1998 using
commercial catch data from July 1996 to December
1997, yielding an abundance estimate of 224 000 tons
(CV 0.44; Branch and Roberts 1998). This time period
included two spawning seasons that should have in-
flated the mean cpue, but the latter was some 25%
lower than the January 1997 estimate. However, in-
dustry argued that some fishing effort had been di-
rected at other deep-water species and that it was not
possible to differentiate that effort from fishing directed
at orange roughy. Despite considerable scepticism from
government scientists, the cpue estimate was rejected
as unreliable because it was considered negatively 
Boyer et al.: Managing the Developing Namibian Orange Roughy Fishery2001 211
Table III: Relative biomass estimates from surveys of orange roughy aggregations before corrections for biases were applied
(CVs in parenthesis)
QMA
Acoustic estimate (tons) Swept-area estimate (tons)
1997 1998 1999 2000 1997 1998 1999 2000
Rix 21 579 07 572 * * ANS ANS 1 006 ANS
(0.15) (0.19) (0.59)
Frankies 17 925 04 940 1 782 4 300 30 995 2 400 3 055 ANS
(0.25) (0.38) (0.25) (0.30) (0.37) (0.60) (0.35)
Johnies 34 179 03 570 * ANS 57 650 6 980 2 137 3 330
(0.21) (0.43) (0.27) (0.25) (0.40) (0.34)
All three QMAs 73 683 16 082 
(0.12) (0.17)
ANS Area not surveyed 
* Behaviour of orange roughy did not permit acoustic assessment
biased compared to the 1997 estimate. The 1996 B0
estimate of 306 000 tons was used again for risk assess-
ments.
Two scientific surveys had been conducted in July
1997 using acoustics and swept-area techniques (Huse
et al. 1997). The results are summarized in Table III,
and Table IV shows the total biomass estimates after
the data were corrected for biases (Boyer and Hampton
2001a). These biases were estimated through a similar
process to the biases used in commercial-catch-based
swept-area estimates, although in this instance the
survey practitioners estimated the level and range of
the biases. 
As the 1997 acoustic survey estimate was much
lower than the biomass estimated from cpue data,
risks were also calculated using the acoustic survey
value (adjusted for pre-1997 catch removals) as input
to the calculation of B0, especially as these surveys
were considered more rigorous than the swept-area
surveys. Risks were calculated for a range of fishing-
down TACs (10 000–15 000 tons) and BMSY TACs
(4 000–6 000 tons). Using the commercial catch rate
estimates of B0, the results showed that the risk of
the stock declining below 0.5B0 by the end of the
time period would be low (0.24), even for the highest
catch strategy. However, using the B0 calculated from
acoustic survey data, the risks were substantial
(0.98). Additionally, the 14-year catch strategy was
changed to 3- and 6-year scenarios because it was re-
alized that such disparate estimates of B0 made pre-
dictions beyond such a time period too speculative.
Even when applying the B0 calculated from the
acoustic index, the risks of B0 falling below 0.5 after
3 and 6 years were 0.12 and 0.53 respectively. This
level of risk was considered acceptable, because
catch levels could be reduced in subsequent years if
the risk level rose as subsequent data were gathered.
Although fishery-independent indices of abundance
are generally more reliable than fishery-dependent
ones, the acoustic results were not given full weight
in the provision of TAC advice. Considerable concern
had been raised during the 1998 assessment about
the reliability of the acoustic estimates, because the
acoustic survey had been implemented for the first
time and reservations were expressed about the inter-
pretation of the initial survey results. Judgement
about reliability was to be assessed after the second
acoustic survey had been conducted in 1998. 
As a result of the uncertainties in the assessment,
the same TAC as the previous year, 12 000 tons, was
recommended for the 1998/99 fishing season. This
figure was ratified by the Namibian Cabinet.
THIRD STOCK ASSESSMENT (JANUARY 1999)
During July 1998, another pair of surveys was
conducted (Dalen et al. 1998). The results indicated
a severe decline in abundance since the previous sur-
veys (Table III). 
In the previous assessments, absolute abundance
estimates of the total orange roughy stock within the
200 mile EEZ of Namibia were used in modelling al-
ternative future catch strategies and associated risks.
However, the second research survey and commercial
swept-area estimates all indicated declines beyond that
which could be accounted for by fishing. Additionally
there were concerns that the estimates of B0 based on
commercial swept-area analysis could have been
severely overestimated. Therefore a new approach,
treating the data as relative indices, was implemented.
An age-structured model was fitted to the three in-
dices (commercial swept-area, acoustic and research
swept-area series) using Bayesian methods (McAllister
and Ianelli 1997, McAllister and Kirchner 2001).
This was done for all grounds combined and then for
each ground separately. The analysis highlighted a
conflict in interpretation of the data. If more weight
was given to the indices as absolute abundance esti-
mates, the assessment would “flick over” from pes-
simistic to optimistic (McAllister and Kirchner 2001).
Industry used the highly inflated commercial swept-
area abundance indices (which were still considered
in the assessment) as well as the argument that the
environment was negatively impacting catch rates and
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Table IV: Median biomass estimates of aggregations from surveys and commercial data corrected for biases to provide absolute
biomass estimates (CVs in parenthesis)
Survey type
Median biomass estimate (tons) 
1994/95 1996 1997 1998 1999
Commercial swept area 305 000 178 000 129 000 47 000 *
(all grounds) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38)
Acoustic survey (three main – – 118 185 26 493 *
grounds only) (0.22) (0.25)
* Comparable data not available
research survey results, in asserting that the stocks
were still largely healthy.
The analysis suggested that the depletion ranged
from 0.49 to 0.86 for the four QMAs. Although all
indices suggested a decline in the quantity of fish
available to the fishery on each ground between 1997
and 1998, it was greater than could be explained by
catches alone, suggesting that other factors than fishing
had caused the fish to become unavailable to the fishery.
Owing to the uncertainty in the state of the stock, a
two-step approach to the 1998/99 TAC was recom-
mended: the catch level of the previous fishing season
was reduced to the rather arbitrary level of 9 000 tons,
a level that would not have serious consequences to
the profitability of the industry, but should have been
within safe limits of sustainability. Another 3 000 tons
was to be issued if catch rates and survey estimates
warranted such action, so bringing the total TAC to
the same level as the previous year. Although some
government scientists felt that, on precautionary
grounds, this TAC was too high, it went forward in
the TAC recommendations. Only 2 500 tons of orange
roughy were caught during the year, so the extra
quota was not released.
An additional recommendation that was proposed
and accepted was to close one of the grounds in order
to test whether the decline in abundance of orange
roughy on the fishing grounds was attributable to
some form of disturbance. Frankies, the ground with
the highest depletion in catch rates, was closed in
April 1999, although no fishing had actually taken
place there since the end of 1998.
FOURTH STOCK ASSESSMENT (FEBRUARY 2000)
Further acoustics and swept-area surveys were con-
ducted on the three main QMAs during 1999 (Staalesen
et al. 1999). While some of the technical details of
the surveys changed, the basic survey strategy re-
mained similar to that of the previous surveys (Boyer
and Hampton 2001a). The results are presented in
Table III. A clear change in the behaviour of orange
roughy was noted during this survey. In general the
fish were more dispersed, so identification of acoustic
marks was uncertain on two of the grounds. An
acoustic biomass estimate was only possible on
Frankies, the ground closed to fishing for the previous
four months. Swept-area estimates were produced for
all three grounds. Once again, the results indicated a
further decline in the abundance on Johnies, and pos-
sibly also at Frankies (Table III).
The assessment of 1999 was updated, but the com-
mercial cpue index was changed to a non-stationarity
form (Kirchner and McAllister in press). Their analysis
demonstrated that the conventional swept-area ap-
proach applied in the earlier assessments had defined
“sampling” strata or areas, such that clusters of very
high catch rates had been extrapolated to large, poorly
sampled areas, so giving rise to grossly overestimated
biomass. The revised procedure no longer assumed that
orange roughy aggregations were stationary from year
to year, but now, for each year, redefined “sampling”
strata on the basis of relative catch rates of adjacent
commercial tows. Thus, high catch rates were aver-
aged only for those regions in which similar values
were found; such catch rates were no longer extra-
polated to large, poorly sampled areas. The revised
commercial swept-area method gave an estimate of
unexploited biomass of about 74 000 tons compared
to the 1997 estimate of about 305 000 tons (Table V).
Again, the assessment indicated that the large de-
cline in the various indices seemed not to be accounted
for by fishing mortality alone, perhaps reflecting some
other processes, such as the effect of fishing on
school stability or some form of aperiodic aggregating
behaviour (Brandão and Butterworth 2000). A further
alternative tested was that of mass emigration of fish
from the fishing grounds, such as could be expected
from large-scale habitat alteration. As an example,
note was taken of the rapid decline in availability of
orange roughy in the Challenger Plateau fishery in
New Zealand in the early 1990s and more recently in
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Table V: Commercial swept-area estimates of orange roughy biomass for the initial year of fishing for each ground and in combi-
nation using the initial methodology applied in 1997 (old) and that revised for the 2000 (new) assessment (after Kirchner
and McAllister in press)
Biomass from old Biomass from new Ratio of old/newQMA Initial year swept-area method swept-area method estimates(tons) (tons)
Hotspot 1994/1995 021 916 22 081 0.99
Rix 1996 019 724 12 339 1.60
Frankies 1996 124 543 21 893 5.67
Johnies 1994/1995 138 476 17 417 7.95
All QMAs 304 659 73 820 4.13
the Chatham Rise stock (Annala and Sullivan 1996).
These possible causes of an apparent change in abun-
dance were statistically evaluated by McAllister and
Kirchner (in press). They suggested that the catch re-
moval hypothesis had a low level of probability (i.e.
credibility) on Frankies, Johnies and Hotspot, but still
had a high level of probability on Rix (McAllister
and Kirchner 2001). This was because the declines in
the indices on the first three grounds were the steepest
and most difficult to account for by catch removal 
only. The two hypotheses of a temporary change in
availability of orange roughy yielded moderate levels of
probability on Rix, Hotspot and Frankies, but very
low levels on Johnnies. The mass emigration hypo-
thesis had considerably higher level of probability
than the others on Hotspot and Johnies, but still mode-
rate on Rix and Frankies. This was the only hypothesis
to retain credibility on all four grounds after data
analysis.
During the assessment, the results on alternative
hypotheses for orange roughy behaviour were acknow-
ledged to be based on a new methodology that needed
further testing and peer-review. Owing to the newness
of the methodology, the results were difficult to in-
terpret, especially when compared across fishing
grounds. As the results were based on relatively few
data points and several uncertain technical inputs,
and the likelihood of different hypotheses being true
on the various grounds seemed counter-intuitive, the
results were considered to be too preliminary to be
used to support management decisions. McAllister
and Kirchner (2001, in press) give a detailed discussion
of the development of this new methodology. 
In the face of the various conflicting evidence pre-
sented, government scientists maintained a precau-
tionary approach in their provision of TAC advice. A
lower TAC was recommended on the basis that low
stock sizes were still probable given the data and given
that the most parsimonious hypothesis, catch removal,
could not yet be ruled out. This proposal was considered
fitting for a long-lived species such as orange roughy,
for which a reduction in catches now would not re-
sult in any loss in long-term yield. This hypothesis
indicated that the QMAs were all below the 0.5B0
level and that catches needed to be reduced to 1 200 tons
to halt the decreasing trend. That figure was recom-
mended as a TAC for 2000/2001, with the option to
increase it should the commercial catch rates or survey
indices improve substantially. The authorities fol-
lowed these recommendations, granting an initial
TAC of 1 200 tons. However, following some pressure
from industry after they made a few good catches, it
was subsequently increased by 540 tons, despite neither
mean catch rates nor survey results providing clear
evidence of an improvement in the state of the stock.
State of the stock in the year 2000
Acoustic surveys of Frankies and Rix and a swept-
area survey of Johnies were conducted in July 2000
(Boyer et al. 2001). The estimates indicated little
change in the general status of the stock, and com-
mercial catch rates confirmed this interpretation.
The development of the orange roughy fishery
had, by mid 2000, reached the end of its third phase
(Miller 1999). Biological research had been conducted
such that there was some idea, albeit rather uncertain,
of long-term productivity. A defined management
strategy had been set up, and the necessary monitoring
and control systems had been established.
DISCUSSION
This paper has documented some of the important
stages and processes in the development of the orange
roughy fishery in Namibia. A key issue raised at the
outset was how to manage a new fishery. The develop-
ment of deep-water fisheries is littered with tales of
rapid development, spectacular early catches, fol-
lowed by even more rapid and spectacular collapses
(Miller 1999, and see Moore 1999 for a review). 
The Namibian authorities went to great lengths to
guard against such a sequence of events in their orange
roughy fishery. Assessment and management created
a paradoxical situation whereby state-of-the-art as-
sessment and modelling yielded high quality advice,
yet the fishery virtually collapsed within a very short
time. There was close cooperation with industry at all
stages. A number of strategies for dealing with un-
certainty were incorporated into the stock assessment,
including a Bayesian approach and management 
process, and attempts were made to apply the pre-
cautionary approach (F.A.O. 1995). In addition,
adaptive management was applied through institu-
tional learning. As a result there should be some
lessons to be learned from the assessment and man-
agement of orange roughy in Namibia. Some aspects
provide good examples of how a new developing
fishery should be managed; others are clearly illus-
trative of procedures to be avoided. In particular, one
of the main reasons why the management of orange
roughy failed to prevent stock collapse was under-
estimation of some of the uncertainties, particularly
those reliant on basic understanding of the biology and
behaviour of orange roughy (Ludwig et al. 1993).
Francis and Shotton (1997) provide an elegant
classification of uncertainty in the assessment and
management of fish stocks. These categories are used
here to illustrate the Namibian attempts at managing
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its orange roughy resource and in particular some of
the major types of uncertainty that detracted from its
success.
Process uncertainty
Process uncertainty accounts for the natural variability
in biological processes, and particularly those that
control stock productivity. Orange roughy inhabit deep
water where environmental conditions are assumed
to be relatively constant. Measurements of oxygen,
salinity and temperature during four annual research
surveys indicate that, at least at the accuracy of mea-
surement, there was little variability. Likewise, com-
mercial vessels report catching orange roughy within
a temperature band of 3°C suggesting that, even if there
is some variability, the fish try to minimize this by
seeking a constant environment. Therefore it is intuitive
to expect the biological processes that control the pro-
ductivity of this stock to have a low degree of stochas-
ticity.
One of the hypotheses tested to account for the large
decline in orange roughy biomass on the spawning
grounds was that spawning periodicity was either very
long or highly variable (McAllister and Kirchner
2001). On purely biological grounds this seems un-
likely, but it cannot be disproved. Although little was
known about the degree of variability of the key bio-
logical processes determining the productivity of orange
roughy off Namibia, it seems unlikely that this would
have accounted for the observed decline in abun-
dance.
Observation uncertainty
Observation uncertainty refers primarily to the ability
to collect data on the fishery, stock abundance and
biological parameters with reasonable precision and
accuracy. Namibia is recognized as having a high de-
gree of control over commercial catches: all orange
roughy vessels carry two fisheries observers and all
landings are made at a single harbour under the control
of fisheries inspectors (Oelofsen 1999, Boyer and
Hampton 2001b). Therefore, there was little observation
uncertainty in monitoring catches of orange roughy.
The geographic position of orange roughy aggre-
gations, far from any national borders, and the fact
that Namibia has a strong monitoring, control and
surveillance policy, which not only does not tolerate
transgressors, but also has the means to apprehend
them. Therefore, illegal and hence unrecorded, catches
are not suspected to have been a factor. 
As little was known about orange roughy at the
beginning of the fishery, much research was directed
at the resource. Shipboard and port sampling were
initiated to monitor changes in population structure,
both between grounds and over time within grounds,
as well as to track reproductive development. These
activities were conducted with the full support of the
industry, and generally with their active participation.
While there was doubtless some uncertainty in this
monitoring process, especially early on, it seems un-
likely that this could have accounted for any large errors
in the assessment of the stock. 
In order to determine the abundance of orange
roughy, two types of surveys were conducted in 1997
and have been repeated each year since. As there are
many uncertainties in the estimates, it was decided in
1998 that they should be used only to monitor trends
rather than absolute abundance. Additionally, the errors
of acoustic estimates have been modelled in an at-
tempt to assess the probability distribution of the esti-
mates (Boyer and Hampton 2001a), so accounting
for the most important uncertainties.
However, virtually all research on Namibian orange
roughy has been directed at the aggregating compo-
nent of the stock, through either commercial sampling
or surveys. Little is known about the fish outside the
aggregations, and the lack of knowledge of this com-
ponent of the stock may have had severe consequences
for the ability to assess abundance accurately. This is
discussed in more detail below.
Model uncertainty
This form of uncertainty deals primarily with deciding
on the best method of representing the stock dynamics
of the species in question (McAllister and Kirchner
[2001] refer to this as “structural uncertainty”). The
conceptual model of the Namibian orange roughy
population and community dynamics contained a
number of critical assumptions, not least of which
concerned stock structure. Initially the stock was
considered to be a single unit, but by 1997 it was as-
sumed that each QMA was, for both stock dynamics
and management purposes, entirely separate, this
being the most precautionary approach. In addition,
it was assumed that a constant proportion of the
stock migrated annually to the QMAs to spawn. This
proportion was unknown, but it was implicitly as-
sumed that most of the stock spawned each year.
From these assumptions, it followed that any decline
in the stock would be attributable to fishing mortality
rather than to changes in behaviour of the stock or
stochasticity in the natural behaviour patterns.
Between 1997 and 1999, the swept-area abundance
estimates based on commercial data declined between
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2- and 8-fold on the various grounds, and the research-
based swept-area estimates by 10–55 times. Similarly,
the acoustics estimates dropped by an order of magni-
tude. Four hypotheses were proposed and tested to
account for these declines: first, that it was due to the
direct impact of fishing; second, that the aggregating
behaviour of orange roughy was being disrupted by
fishing activities; third, that there was some previously
unrecorded stochasticity or periodicity in the spawning
frequency of Namibian orange roughy; finally, that there
had been a mass emigration or mortality. Modelling
suggested, on the basis of the goodness of fit to the
data for models based on these hypotheses, that the
catch removal hypothesis remained plausible only on
Rix. The mass emigration hypothesis remained plau-
sible on all four fishing grounds, and the hypotheses
invoking behavioural changes had low credibility on
Johnnies and Hotspot but remained credible on the
other two grounds. Biologists argued, on the basis of
their experience with other fish stocks, that depletion
by catch removals was more likely, but they were unable
to provide empirical data to support their case. No
consensus has yet been reached on whether these hy-
potheses are biologically feasible.
During the initial stages of the fishery, many bio-
logical parameters on Namibian orange roughy were
unknown, creating uncertainty in estimating the pro-
ductivity of the resource. These parameters were for
the first two years of assessment assumed to be the
same as for New Zealand orange roughy. While this
may be intuitively sensible, it did create an additional
source of uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis involving
testing a range of plausible values showed which
were the most critical parameters, e.g. age at maturity,
growth and natural mortality. Considerable effort was
then expended to determine these parameters using
Namibian data, which were used from 2000 onwards.
Indeed, the use of a fishing-down strategy to determine
optimal fishing levels, rather than taking the less-
aggressive approach of studying the biology and pro-
ductivity, as recommended by Clark (1995), though
seemingly safe at the time, can now be seen to have
been a high-risk strategy.
In the Bayesian assessment, priors were included
for key parameters such as natural mortality, to account
formally for the uncertainty of such parameters in the
stock assessment process (McAllister and Kirchner
2001, in press). Also, a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment
relationship was assumed, and recruitment was also
allowed to assume some variability, using the same
values as in New Zealand.
Another type of model uncertainty was introduced
in the initial estimates of abundance using commercial
cpue data as a proxy for swept-area data. It was as-
sumed that the area of an aggregation was fixed, so
mean catch rates were raised by the same area each
year to calculate abundance. Kirchner and McAllister
(in press) analysed the spatial distribution of the ag-
gregations and concluded that the area was, in fact,
not constant, so assuming stationarity greatly inflated
the abundance estimates.
In addition, an assumption made during the initial
phases of this fishery was that cpue tracked abundance,
despite strong indications from Clark (1996) that this
may not be so for orange roughy. Indeed, some initial
indications of declining catch rates in 1996 were dis-
carded as artefacts and the decline was only accepted
and incorporated in the stock assessment in 1998.
Indeed, the cpue data, especially when used in a swept-
area type model, were repeatedly used by industry as
evidence for the robustness of the stock. As noted above,
this type of analysis should have been used with con-
siderably more circumspection for an aggregating
species such as orange roughy, especially with the lack
of knowledge of the species’ aggregating dynamics.
Surveys of orange roughy were conducted using
swept-area and acoustic techniques. Once two surveys
had been conducted and a time-series existed, these
were used as relative indices, recognizing the uncer-
tainty in the estimates attributable to various biases
(Boyer and Hampton 2001a). However, a major uncer-
tainty that is still not resolved is whether the surveys,
by targeting spawning aggregations, were surveying a
constant portion of the total stock each year, or whether
this was variable. This again relates to the lack of un-
derstanding of the behaviour of orange roughy, and
particularly of the aggregations.
It is concluded that the uncertainties introduced
through the use of inappropriate model structure or
assumptions contributed significantly to an overall
failure to predict the decline in orange roughy abun-
dance off Namibia, this form of uncertainty being driven
by a lack of knowledge of the biological processes.
Estimation uncertainty
Estimation uncertainty is a secondary type of uncer-
tainty derived from some or all of the above three types. 
It was recognized from the early days of the fishery
that any attempt to estimate optimal catch levels
would be fraught with uncertainty, a natural conse-
quence of any new fishery where information is lacking.
To compensate for the lack of data, extensive use was
made of sophisticated models. Priors on more than
3–5 key biological and catch parameters and several
annual process error terms were introduced through
Bayesian statistics, allowing for uncertainty to be in-
corporated in a rigorous and structured way into the
assessment models (McAllister and Kirchner 2001).
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Hence, the stock assessment (and risk analysis) was
based on best guesses by the available “experts” and
elaborate analyses of the limited data available to
provide indications of biases and uncertainty in stock
biomass estimates. However, some argued that high
levels of analysis did not compensate for the limitations
of the data being used (as suggested by Ulltang 1996,
Rose 1997, Schnute and Richards 2001). Similarly,
the priors for catchability were constructed through
discussion and agreement by consensus. While this
had the advantage of combining accumulated know-
ledge and experience of many people, it often lacked
objectiveness. In hindsight, some of the uncertainties
may have been underestimated, possibly by a large
amount, especially those that affect the estimation of
abundance.
Another unforeseen consequence of achieving con-
sensus was a narrowing of uncertainty. It is suggested
that, while this process of constructing priors has its
merits, input should be permitted without pressure.
Further, all inputs should be used, in other words,
there should not be any attempt to reach consensus.
Similarly, opposing views (and trends) should not be
averaged, because doing so reduces very real uncer-
tainty.
During the initial assessments, the biomass at MSY
was treated as a target reference point. However, recent
literature suggests that this should be a limit reference
point (Mace and Gabriel 1999, Serchuck et al. 1999).
In addition, New Zealand assessments suggested that
BMSY for orange roughy was around 0.3 of the virgin
stock level (Francis et al. 1992) and is derived from a
target rate of fishing mortality where catches change
with stock fluctuations and are hence maximized.
This method requires good estimation of stock size
and productivity. However, owing to the uncertainties
in this estimate, the more conservative (precautionary)
approach of Clark (1995) was followed, i.e. assuming
BMSY to be closer to 0.5B0, a level derived from a
constant catch strategy and hence the more conservative
of the two methods. That this level is “precautionary”
is highlighted by the fact that the stated management
aim in Australia is to rebuild orange roughy stocks to
0.3B0 by 2004 (Bax 2000).
It is currently not possible to state whether the es-
timates of virgin biomass, BMSY and productivity were
erroneous or whether there were changes in the be-
haviour of orange roughy, making the component of
the stock assessed in, for instance, 1997 different
from that assessed in subsequent years. Certainly the
original estimates of abundance using commercial
catch data were positively biased, but detailed re-
analysis of the early surveys, when the biomass ap-
peared to be high, indicate that the original survey
estimates were essentially valid and that the perceived
large decline in abundance of fish in the QMAs is
real.
Once again it has to be concluded that the major
uncertainty in estimating biomasses and productivity
emanated from the underlying conceptual model that
was assumed for orange roughy, rather than stochas-
ticity in the biological processes or observation uncer-
tainty.
Implementation uncertainty
Implementation uncertainty refers to the extent to
which management policies and recommendations
were implemented. The recommendations made by
the Deep Water Fisheries Working Group originally,
and later by government scientists, were generally
implemented by the authorities with a high degree of
faithfulness. In 1997, the authorities were more cau-
tious than the DWFWG. Therefore, this form of un-
certainty does not seem to have played a major role. 
However, there is definitely room for several im-
provements to the form of management advice. Assess-
ments tended to present results in the form of a mean
and a range of probability (90% probability intervals
in earlier assessments, but usually 95% in the later
ones). In reality, recipients of such information tended
to become fixated on the point value (the mean) and
to ignore the range. As point estimates are meaning-
less when CVs are large, e.g. >0.3, it may have been
more constructive to give ranges only, perhaps using
a fairly wide probability interval of, for example,
80%. Additionally, the outputs of some procedures
had such wide probability intervals that the results
were uninformative and hence of little use for man-
agement. Finally, without concrete evidence to validate,
or at least support these results, managers (and often
scientists too) failed to trust the outputs.
A set of fishing conditions was applied to promote
exploratory fishing. However, these were too compli-
cated to monitor and enforce efficiently. As a result,
industry tended to “explore” when catch rates on ag-
gregations were low, i.e. out of the spawning period,
when the chances of finding new aggregations or
defining the limits of known aggregations were re-
duced. Incentives to encourage exploration were de-
veloped in conjunction with industry, but the costs
were deemed to outweigh the potential benefits, so
exploration was limited. If the proportion of exploratory
fishing trawls had been calculated over shorter time
periods, e.g. per month or per trip rather than per year,
then this strategy may have yielded greater benefits,
although it would have been more costly to industry.
Some management protocols were applied, espe-
cially in respect of exploratory fishing, but no proce-
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dures were developed for setting harvesting levels on
the known grounds. This forced annual debate on the
state of the stocks and harvesting levels, an extremely
costly and time-consuming exercise for all involved.
Notwithstanding the above, it seems reasonable in
general to conclude that implementation of scientific
recommendations and management procedures had
little impact on the subsequent decline in catches.
Indeed, TAC levels were set even lower than those
recommended and so may have extended the life of
the fishery. Vessel participation in the fishery was
strictly limited to a maximum of five, compared to,
for example, the Australian orange roughy fishery in
which, in 1999, there were 34 vessels still fishing for
orange roughy, down from a maximum of 67 in 1990
(Bax 2000).
Institutional uncertainty
Institutional uncertainty is a serious concern in Africa
where political, and hence policy, instability is common.
Namibia has had a strong, stable government for the
past decade. The government formulated clear policy
towards the utilization of marine resources and, despite
some pressure from the fishing industry, largely abided
by it. Owing to the importance of fishing to the
Namibian economy, most efforts to protect resources
and to increase the long-term output of fisheries
gained widespread political, social and economic
support. The official policy towards the development
of new fishery resources remained unchanged, but
some adaptive institutional learning naturally oc-
curred as the orange roughy fishery developed. The
establishment of a working group consisting of govern-
ment managers and scientists and senior industry
representatives also reinforced the stability in the as-
sessment and management of the resource.
One restriction in this developing country of Namibia
was the lack of local scientific competence. This was
solved by contracting international expertise and, be-
cause such expertise was temporary, a progressive
training programme was implemented such that by
2000 most of the survey and assessment work was
conducted locally.
CONCLUSIONS
The Namibian orange roughy fishery developed and
declined in just six years. The establishment of the
fishery was planned and controlled in a rational manner.
During the initial “discovery” phase, catches were
monitored. A research programme was launched to
determine and monitor the state of the stocks, while
management routines were being established. Moni-
toring and control was implemented during the second
phase, and strategies to promote further exploration
and the collection of pertinent data were also intro-
duced. The third phase saw consolidation of all these
activities such that by 2000 much of the research,
management and control of the fishery were routine.
The scientifically based recommendations were fol-
lowed with a large degree of faithfulness, and the
fishery was, in general, well controlled. Despite this,
catches declined unexpectedly fast and, within a couple
of years, all stocks were estimated to have been de-
pressed below BMSY.
Elaborate attempts were made in the assessments
to estimate the abundance of the stocks and to quantify
the risks associated with various harvesting levels. One
of the greatest difficulties for the assessment was to
formulate precautionary advice on TACs in the face
of conflicting interpretations of available data and as-
sessment results, and their implications for resource
status. The spawning behaviour of orange roughy was,
and still remains, poorly understood, and the dynamics
of aggregation formation and dispersion are similarly
unknown. Therefore, alternative assumptions covering
a wide range of biological possibilities were used in
the formulation of the qualitative conceptual models
of stock dynamics and behaviour, so making inter-
pretation of results difficult. 
Biomass was overestimated in the first stock assess-
ment owing to the use of a conventional swept-area
estimate of abundance from data on commercial catch
rate. The initial survey results, although considerably
less than the commercial swept-area estimates, also
indicated that the harvesting rates achieved in the
early years of the fishery would lead to a gradual
fishing-down of the stock towards BMSY. Subsequent
catch and survey data indicated a dramatic decline in
abundance of all stocks, apparently at rates greater
than could be accounted for by fishing. Whether this
was attributable to overestimating abundance during
the early surveys, in which case overfishing could
have caused the decline, or to a change in fish be-
haviour during the spawning period when the stocks
were surveyed, remains unknown.
Management usually aims to balance the biological
risk of overfishing with the economic loss of under-
fishing, including taking account of future discounting.
However, with a long-lived fish such as orange roughy
there is little loss of yield through underfishing. In
retrospect, the precautionary approach should have
been more rigorously applied, and the limited expan-
sion in effort allowed between 1997 and 1998 should
have been avoided until at least two years of research
survey data had been obtained, to improve the as-
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sessment of abundance. Further time would also have
allowed more information on the biology of Namibian
orange roughy, in particular on spawning and aggre-
gation dynamics, to be gathered. 
The development and decline of the Namibian orange
roughy fishery should serve as a warning to other
newly discovered fisheries. Even for those with excel-
lent management and fisheries control, full cooperation
of industry and high levels of research and population
assessment, catch levels need to be severely limited
until sufficient understanding of behaviour and stock
dynamics allows stock-specific reference points, such
as BMSY, to be determined with confidence. Only then
should a fishery become a fully operational commercial
activity managed to attain optimal sustainable har-
vesting rates.
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